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Abstract
We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these polit-
ical contests could be ineﬀective, namely, the chance of low ability candidates participating
in the contest might be higher than the chance of high ability candidates participating in
the contest (and winning). However, by imposing a costly requirement (fee) on the winner
of the contest, one can guarantee that the contest will be eﬀective.
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1 Introduction
In a primary election, parties select a nominee to run in a general election. In this process
candidates ﬁrst have to decide whether or not to enter a contest to be the party nominee.
Afterwards, if there is more than one entrant, they must compete to determine the winner.
In this paper, we model this situation as a two-stage political contest where there is an
entry stage and a campaigning stage. The cost of campaigning has two components: ﬁrst, the
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1opportunity (entry) costs of running a campaign and second, the expenditure used in campaign-
ing. We model the former as privately known and ﬁxed and the latter as publically known and
variable. Also, each candidate has a publically known ability (charisma), either high or low.
The timing of the model is as follows. In entry stage, the candidates engage each other.
They indicate their interest in running and every candidate learns the abilities of his potential
opponents. Then, given his private cost of entry, he decides whether or not to participate in the
second stage of the contest. The candidates who decide to participate pay their entry costs. After
this stage, all candidates incur their entry costs and learn who has entered. In the second stage,
the candidates compete against each other in what we model as an asymmetric all-pay auction
under complete information. Each candidate chooses expenditure and the candidate with the
highest expenditure/ability ratio wins the primary. Independent of success, all candidates bear
the costs.
In the economic literature, all-pay auctions are studied under complete information where
the players’ valuations for the object are common knowledge (see, for example, Hillman and
Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1993, 1996; Che and Gale, 1998; and Kaplan et al., 2003) or under
incomplete information where each player’s valuation for the object is private information to
that player and only the distribution of the players’ valuations is common knowledge (see, for
example, Amman and Leininger, 1996; Krishna and Morgan, 1997; and Moldovanu and Sela,
2001, 2006). In our model, each candidate has two private parameters: his ability, which is
common knowledge, and his entry cost, which is private information.
We ﬁnd that our model has cutoﬀ equilibria, where any candidate with an entry cost higher
than the cutoﬀ for his type (ability) will decide to stay out of the contest and any candidate
with an entry cost lower than the cutoﬀ for his type will decide to participate in the contest.
2We show that given these equilibrium entry decisions the contest may be ineﬀective; namely,
the chance that a high ability candidate will participate may be lower than the chance that
a low-ability candidate will participate. Consequently, there may be a higher chance that the
party may choose the low ability candidate. We show that the party can overcome this problem
and guarantee that the contest will be eﬀective by imposing a requirement (task or fee) to be
paid by the winner of the primary.
Finally, we consider the situation where the party wishes to minimize the total expenditures.
In the classical all-pay contest without entry costs, if the number of candidates is endogenous,
the contest designer should decrease the number of candidates if he wishes to minimize the
total eﬀort. In our model, however, we ﬁnd that the total expenditures may either increase or
decrease in the number of candidates. Therefore, manipulating the number of candidates in
order to change the total expenditures may have unintended consequences in political contests
with private entry costs.
2 The model
Consider n candidates competing in a political contest for one position. The candidates have the
same value for winning the position (contest) which is normalized to be 1. Candidate i’s ability,
αi ≥ 0, is common knowledge. Assume that there are n1 candidates with high ability of α1 and
n2 candidates with a low ability of α2 < α1.1 Participating in the contest generates a (sunk)
cost ci/αi for candidate i , where ci is the entry cost which is private information and is drawn
independently from the cumulative distribution function F which is on the interval [c,c] where
1For simplicity, we assume two types of abilities. Our results can be generalized to the case with any number
of types.
30 ≤ c < minαi. We assume that F is continuously diﬀerentiable with F(c) = 0 and is common
knowledge.2 In the ﬁrst stage, all the candidates are engaged, they learn the valuations of their
opponents and each one decides whether to stay out or participate in the second stage of the
contest. The candidates who decide to participate pay their entry costs. Then, in the second
stage, these candidates see who else has decided to participate and compete in an all-pay auction
under complete information such that the candidate with the highest expenditure/ability ratio
xi
ai wins the nomination, while all the candidates pay their cost of eﬀort. That is, if candidate i
decides to participate at the second stage of the contest, pays his entry cost ci, exerts an eﬀort
of xi and wins the contest, then his payoﬀ is given by 1−
(xi+ci)
αi . On the other hand, if he does




In our model there frequently are trivial equilibria strategies in which one of the candidates
decides to always participate independent of his entry cost, and all the other candidates decide
to stay out of the contest in the second stage. In order to prevent such equilibrium strategies
(when n1,n2 > 1) we assume that candidates of the same type (same α) follow the same strategy.
We say that an equilibrium is type-symmetric if all candidates of the same type follow the same
strategy.
In the second stage the candidates compete in the all-pay auction where the candidates’
abilities are common knowledge.3 If there is only one entrant in the second stage, he will bid
zero and win. If there is more than one entrant, there are three cases that need to be examined.
2To avoid a trivial solution assume that F(α2) > 0 (there is a chance that player i has a cost lower than α2).
3The complete analysis of the equilibrium in the all-pay auction under complete information is given by Baye
et al. (1996).
4Let us denote ei for the number of entrants of type i.
Case 1: There are two or more entrants with low abilities (type 2) only.
Then, these candidates randomize on the interval [0,α2] according to their eﬀort cumulative
distribution functions F2(x), which is given by the indiﬀerence condition:
α2F
e2−1
2 (x) − x = 0 (1)





e2−1 . Total eﬀort is
e2
  α2
0 xdF2(x) = α2 and the expected payoﬀ of every candidate is u2 = 0.
Case 2: There are e1 ≥ 2 entrants with high abilities (type 1) and any number of entrants
with low abilities.
In this case all the candidates of type 2 stay out and the candidates of type 1 enter in
the second stage. These candidates randomize on the interval [0,α1] according to their eﬀort
cumulative distribution functions F1(x), which is given by the indiﬀerence condition:
α1F
e1−1
1 (x) − x = 0 (2)





e1−1 . The total expected eﬀort
is e1
  α1
0 xdF1(x) = α1 and the expected payoﬀ of every candidate is u1 = 0.
Case 3: There is only one entrant with high ability and e2 ≥ 1 entrants with low abilities.
Then, the candidates randomize on the interval [0,α2] according to their eﬀort cumulative
distribution functions, F1(x) and F2(x), which are given by the indiﬀerence conditions:
α1F
e2
2 (x) − x = α1 − α2 (3)
α2F1(x) − x = 0
Thus, type 1’s eﬀort is distributed according to F1(x) = x
α1 , while type 2’s eﬀort is


















2(e2+1) , and the respective expected payoﬀs are u1 =
α1 − α2 and u2 = 0.
Now, given the analysis of the candidates’ behavior in the second stage of the contest, we
can analyze their entry decisions in the ﬁrst stage. In the ﬁrst stage, n1 candidates with ability
of α1 and n2 candidates with ability of α2 are engaged and each of them decides whether to
participate or not, and those who decide to participate pay their private entry costs. Denote by
di(c) the entry decision (the probability of entering) if one has entry cost c and ability αi > 0.
Proposition 1 The entry decision (the probability of entering) of a candidate with cost ci and
ability αi > 0 in the ﬁrst stage is
di(c) =

      
      
1 if c ≤ c∗
i
0 if c > c∗
i
where the equilibrium cutoﬀs c∗
i, i = 1,2 are given by4
c∗
1 = (α1 − α2)(1 − F(c∗




2 = α2(1 − F(c∗
1))n1(1 − F(c∗
2))n2−1 (5)
In the symmetric case where α1 = α2 and n is the total number of candidates, the symmetric
4Obviously, this equilibrium is for n1,n2 ≥ 1. If n1 ≥ 2,n2 ≥ 2 and c= 0, then any type-symmetric equilibrium




2 ≤ c or
c
∗
2 ≥ c, c < c
∗




1 ≤ c.) A cutoﬀ ci > c implies that everyone of
type i would enter and a cutoﬀ ci < c implies that everyone of type i stays out.
6entry decision is given by
di(c) =

      
      
1 if c ≤ c∗
0 if c > c∗
where the equilibrium cutoﬀ c∗ > 0 is the solution of5
c∗ = α(1 − F(c∗))n−1 (6)
Proof. See Appendix.
The entry decision described by Proposition 1 is such that any candidate with ability αi
and an entry cost higher than the equilibrium cutoﬀ c∗
i will stay out of the contest and any
candidate with ability αi and an entry cost lower than the equilibrium cutoﬀ c∗
i will participate
in the second stage of the contest. One may also notice that in our model, sometimes there is no
entry and hence no nominee. This still ﬁts many elections — often in US congressional elections,
either the Democratic or Republican party does not select a nominee in the primary election
and the other major party runs unoppossed.
4 Eﬀectiveness
Given the equilibrium strategies, a candidate with ability α2 has a positive payoﬀ only if he is




2))n2−1 − c = c∗
2 − c
Similarly, a candidate with ability α1 will proﬁt α1 when he is in the second stage of the
contest alone and will proﬁt the diﬀerence α1 − α2 when he is in the second stage with only
5For the symmetric case, any symmetric equilibrium is interior.
7candidates with abilities of α2. Thus, the payoﬀ of a candidate with ability α1 and entry cost
c ≤ c∗
1 is
(α1 − α2)(1 − F(c∗
1))n1−1 + α2(1 − F(c∗
2))n2(1 − F(c∗
1))n1−1 − c = c∗
1 − c





i − c)dF(c) (7)
Deﬁnition 1 We say that a contest is eﬀective if the chance of participation of candidates is
increasing in their abilities. That is, a contest is eﬀective if vi > vj implies c∗
i > c∗
j.
In our model the contest is eﬀective iﬀ c∗
1 > c∗
2. Below we show by an examples that a
candidate with high ability and a relatively low entry cost may decide to stay out of the contest
whereas a candidate with low ability and a relatively high entry cost may decide to participate
in the contest. In other words, the contest is ineﬀective.
Example 1 Consider a contest where n1 = 2, n2 = 1, α1 = 2.25, α2 = 2 and F is a uniform
distribution on [0,1].
By (4) and (5) the equilibrium interior cutoﬀs are given by:6
c∗
1 = (2.25 − 2)(1 − c∗




2 = 2(1 − c∗
1)2
There are two solutions to this system of equations: 1. c∗
1 = 0.34255 and c∗
2 = 0.8644 2.
c∗
1 = 0.62993 and c∗
2 = 0.2739. Note that in the ﬁrst solution the contest is ineﬀective. The
6Note that for simplicity of exposition, in our examples, we will write the equilibrium cutoﬀ equations, (4) and
(5), assuming there is an interior solution and then see if this is indeed the case.
8equilibrium cutoﬀ of the candidate with the low ability α2 is higher than the equilibrium cutoﬀ
of the candidates with the higher ability α1. This result implies that the expected payoﬀ of the
candidate with the low ability α2 is larger than the expected payoﬀ of his opponents with the
higher abilities α1. This then implies that the candidate with the low ability is more likely to
be selected than the candidate with the high ability.
The intuition for why this is possible is that a candidate’s willingness to enter depends upon
his expected surplus of being in the contest. This surplus depends upon not only the candidate’s
ability but who else decides to enter the contest. Hence, if high-ability candidates are less likely
to enter the contest, then it is indeed possible for low-ability candidates to be more willing to
enter since they are more likely to be alone and reap all the proﬁts.
The contest designer can guarantee that the contest will be eﬀective by the following way
Proposition 2 If the winner of the contest pays a constant fee equal to t = max(0,2α2 − α1)
then c∗
1 > c∗
2 such that the contest is eﬀective.
Proof: By (4) and (5) if α1 > 2α2 we have,
c∗
1 = (α1 − α2)(1 − F(c∗
1))n1−1 + α2(1 − F(c∗
2))n2(1 − F(c∗
1))n1−1
> α2(1 − F(c∗
1))n1−1(1 + (1 − F(c∗




If α1 < 2α2, by imposing a fee of t = 2α2 − α1 the candidates have actually new abilities
given by
  αi = αi − t = αi − (2α2 − α1), i = 1,2.
Since   α1 = 2  α2 and   αi > 0 for all i, the result is obtained.
Hence by imposing a constant fee of t = max(0,2α2 − α1) the party can guarantee that the
chance of participation of the high-ability candidates will be larger than those of the low-ability
9candidates. However, it is important to note that by imposing a constant fee, the party lowers
expected participation in the contest. Thus, before imposing a constant fee, the party should
tradeoﬀ having the beneﬁt of higher participation versus desireability of an eﬀective contest.
5 Total eﬀort
So far we assumed that the number of potential candidates is exogenous. Suppose that the
party is concerned with minimizing the total expenditure (total eﬀort) of the candidates and
it can determine the number of candidates. The reason why the party may be concerned with
total expenditure is that perhaps this may aﬀect future ability of the party to collect from
donors or in the very least aﬀect the ability to compete in the general election. We also assume
that the candidates that are excluded will not pay entry costs. Usually in the standard all-pay
auction under incomplete information the total eﬀort increases in the number of candidates. In
our model the eﬀect of the number of candidates on the total eﬀort is not clear. In order to
demonstrate this point it is suﬃcient to consider the simpler case of symmetric contests. The
following example consists of two cases and shows that an increase in the number of potential
candidates has an ambiguous eﬀect on the candidates’ total eﬀort.
Example 2 Consider a contest where α1 = α2 = 1.
Case 1: The candidates’ entry costs are distributed according to a uniform distribution on
[0,1]. By (6) and (7) the equilibrium cutoﬀ and the total eﬀort are calculated, and as we can see
below, an increase in the number of potential candidates yields an increase of the total eﬀort.







Case 2: The candidates’ entry costs are distributed according to a uniform distribution on
[0.5,0.75]. As we can see below, in this case, an increase in the number of potential candidates
yields a decrease of the total eﬀort.







Note that in both cases the candidates’ abilities are uniformly distributed and the only
diﬀerence is in the support. Thus, we can conclude that only a minor change in distribution
of the candidates’ abilities can dramatically change the eﬀect of the number of candidates on
the total expenditure. In that case, a party should be careful when it controls the number of
candidates, if it wishes to increase or decrease the total expenditure in the contest.
116 Discussion
While our results are somewhat modest, we do point out two counter-intuitive possibilities of
political contests. The ﬁrst possibility is that in some situations there may a higher chance
of selecting a low-ability candidate. This is not due to the diﬀerence in preferences between
the party and the general public, but due to the structure of the primary. The second counter-
intuitive possibility is that reducing the number of candidates may increase the total expenditure
of the race. There is still work left to see if these occur with other contest success functions.
Finally, it is important to notice that in our symmetric model with private entry costs,
the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (see Myerson, 1981; and Riley & Samuelson, 1981) holds
whether or not candidates observe how many others have decided to enter the second stage of
the contest. This implies that our results for the symmetric contest will hold for instance if the
in the second stage the players compete through ﬁrst-price auctions or second-price auctions
instead of all-pay auctions. Moreover, in our asymmetric model similar results will hold for
the second-price auction but not for the ﬁrst-price auction. In particular, the ﬁrst-price auction
when the bidders are uninformed about who enters may generate lower revenue than the revenue
in our model of all-pay auctions. This shows us that there is room to study other contest forms
in our asymmetric environment.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Given the equilibrium in the second stage, a candidate with a low valuation α2 will proﬁt only
when he is in the second stage of the contest alone. The probability of this is (1−F(c∗
1))n1(1−
12F(c∗
2))n2−1 which implies equation (5). On the other hand, a candidate with a high valuation
α1 will proﬁt α1 when he is in the second stage of the contest alone and will proﬁt the diﬀerence
α1−α2 when he is in the second stage with only candidates with valuations of α2. These happen
with probability (1 − F(c∗
2))n2(1 − F(c∗
1))n1−1 and (1 − F(c∗
1))n1−1 which implies equation (4).
The existence of the equilibrium is derived by Brower’s Fixed Point Theorem. The RHS of
equations (4) and (5) form a bounded function from [0,α1]× [0,α2] to [0,α1]× [0,α2] that is
continuous since F is continuous. Therefore, a ﬁxed point must exist. (Note that if cutoﬀ c∗
i
of the ﬁxed point is above b, then it would imply that everyone with value αi enters. Likewise,
if cutoﬀ c∗
i of the ﬁxed point is below a, then it would imply that everyone with value αi stays
out)
In the following we show that if n1, n2 ≥ 2, and a = 0, then any ﬁxed point is interior, that
is F(c∗
1),F(c∗




1) = 0, then the RHS of (4) is greater than or equal to α1 − α2 > 0— a contradiction. If
F(c∗
1) = 1, then the RHS of (4) is zero — also a contradiction. Hence, 0 < F(c∗
1) < 1. A similar
argument shows that 0 < F(c∗
2) < 1 as well. The symmetric case can be shown in a similar, but
simpler manner. ⊡
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